We propose considering assurance as a model management enterprise: saying that a system is safe amounts to specifying three workflows modelling how the safety engineering process is defined and executed, and checking their conformance. These workflows are based on precise data modelling as in functional block diagrams, but their distinctive feature is the presence of relationships between the output data of a process and its input data; hence, the name "Workflow Plus".
I. INTRODUCTION
Safety cases (SC) are an established approach to certifying safety-critical systems in many domains [1] . However, the size and complexity, and hence the cost, of a typical SC for a modern computer-controlled system can be enormous and, in some cases, greater than the cost of building the system [2] . This explains the long-standing demand for tooling to assist and automate the building and maintenance of SCs [3] - [5] . The activity in this domain is mainly based on GSN [6] or CAE [7] diagrams (further collectively referred to as GSN-style diagrams), which has become a de facto standard for documenting SCs. An OMG initiative in this direction, the Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM) [8] , can also be seen as an effort to standardize GSN-like notation in MOF/UML terms.
In this paper, we report on several shortcomings of the GSN formalism for building and maintaining SCs. We will show that the shortcomings are the result of two main GSN's limititations: a) GSN conducts logical inference that (we will show) essentially involves graph-based object-oriented (GBOO) data, in a significantly data-simplified (and at some points, data-ignorant) way. b) GSN manages the basic evidence layer of the argument flow, which (we show) is also a GBOO data enterprise, in an unstructured discrete setting leaving an array of important relationships implicit. We demonstrate with an example (taken from the GSN Community Standard [9] ) that these drawbacks can essentially distort the argument flow and thus create a dangerous false sense of confidence. A significant investment of time and money into the development of tools for GSN-style SCs may be a misguided endeavour as GSN-based tools will suffer from the drawbacks of GSN. We see the need for an assurance framework alternative to GSN, which will better achieve GSN's original focus on structure, decomposition, and argument
We thus return to first principles by specifying a set of requirements for a foundational framework, on which tooling should be based. There are two obvious major requirements necessary to reduce the cost of building and maintaining SCs. R1) Provide support for a careful reusability analysis with multiple reusability layers identified. R2) Allow for an incremental approach based on extensive and effective traceability mechanisms.
These tasks are typical for MDE, and known to be difficult, but in the assurance context they become especially challenging due to the following challenges [10] : C1) the heterogeneity of the artifacts to be integrated in the safety argument flow C2) with the need to include informal and domain-specific artifacts, and a multitude of implicit assumptions about system behaviour and interaction; C3) the necessity to coordinate the functional system development and its safety engineering.
Addressing these challenges gives rise to the following additional requirements. R3) Provide a unified approach to heterogeneous artifacts and argument flow. R4) Be easily understandable by the stakeholders to allow for effective communication, and be easily extensible to accommodate resulting changes from such communication. R5) Be system-engineering friendly. R6) Be safety-engineering friendly, including the necessity to observe reasonable conservatism Requirements R3-5 address challenges C1-3 resp. (and R5 actually spans across all the challenge range); we added R6 as especially important in the domain of safety-critical systems, where a reasonable conservatism is a forced necessity [11] .
In this paper, we propose a modelling framework referred to as Workflow + (briefly, WF + )which meets the requirements on the specification level and shows promising potential in ongoing collaboration with our automotive partners. Tool implementation has not started yet. The goal of the paper is to lay theoretical foundations for applying established MDE methods to the assurance of safety-critical software intensive systems. We believe that this can lead to improved rigour, conceptual and technological clarity, and advanced tool support for both development and assurance of such systems.
WF + employs the idea of a process as a unifying foundation for modelling and analysis of both cyber-physical systems and SEPs (safety engineering processes) that include verification and validation (V&V) of the former analysis. We refer to the framework as WF + due to a special feature of a typical SEP subprocess: its output data are related to its input data rather than disjoint from them as in the classical block diagram setting. The name WF + refers to both a workflow composed from processes with input-output related data, and the approach to SC development based on such workflows.
In the following, we describe the content of the paper and list its technical contributions. In Sect. II, we give a formalized definition of assurance based on the notions of WF +conformance and refinement. We are not aware of such modelbased assurance definitions in the literature. In Sect. III-IV, we show how the WF + -method works with an example: we take a GSN diagram from the GSN Community Standard [9] , interpret it as an SC, recover its semantics, rearrange it in WF + -terms, and rebuild the case as WF + -conformance. We show that the argument flow-a focal point of the GSNbased assurance-is a data-driven enterprise (technically, the inference of derived OCL constraints over data they span from given OCL). This significantly differentiates WF + from GSN, in which data and dataflow are mainly implicit. Sect. V is a comparative analysis of WF + vs. GSN: it can be seen as an evaluation of the new framework against an established one based on the standard example. We show that the argument flow in the example is significantly distorted-a disappointing observation for an example residing in a popular standard since 2011, Version 1 [6, p.5] until now in Version 2 [9, p.14] . In Sect. VIII, we discuss how well WF + addresses the issues described in the empirical survey [12] and satisfy our requirements above. Section IX is a brief overview of related work. Sect. X concludes.
We extensively use colours in our diagrams as a visually convenient additional way to convey semantics of diagram elements, which is encoded by labels (specifically, UML's stereotypes) and shapes of elements. WF + -diagrams contain large amounts of information and normally would span a full page but we made them smaller than desired due to space limitations. The accompanying technical report includes bigger versions of these diagrams, and two additional fragment of the material discussed in Sect. VIII but omitted due to space limits.
II. ASSURANCE AS CONFORMANCE
In this section we introduce our general model of assurance.
A. Background
Approaches to certification of safety-critical software systems have traditionally been divided into two (overlapping) groups: process-based and product-focused (cf. [11] ). An obvious plus of the former is the clarity and practicality of the verification: the regulator can always check whether everything prescribed was really executed. An obvious minus is indirectness: if even everything prescribed was executed, it is unclear how much it guarantees that the product as such is safe. The situation is reversed for product-focused assurance, which assumes that safety can be specified as a collection of attributes such that having their measurable values within a prescribed range can be interpreted as having sufficient evidence that the system is safe. If such a collection could be found, it would provide quite a direct approach to assurance but, unfortunately, reducing safety to an a priori defined finite collection of measurable attributes is unrealistic for complex systems (unless magic creatures like Laplace's daemon are invoked). Indeed, the qualitative and quantitative infinity of possible interactions of such a system as a modern car with its environment (other cars, pedestrians, weather and road conditions, and the driver) makes any hazard analysis performed with a finite number of models and simulations within a finite time period potentially incomplete.
Moreover, any attempt to mitigate this problem with superintelligent mathematical models amenable to super-powerful analysis techniques is doomed to fail as even a perfect "proof" of a system's safety is necessarily carried out within some reasoning system R (be it a logic, a math model, a set of assumptions, or a conceptual framework), while the adequacy of R to the reality being modeled cannot be established within R and needs an external validation R , for which the story is repeated again. 1 Such properties as safety are inherently probabilistic: only if a sufficiently big number of instances of a concrete product X is exploited for a sufficiently long period of time in sufficiently diverse environmental situations, can we then conclude that X is acceptably safe with enough confidence. Unfortunately, when a new system goes into production, neither of the above "if"s is available so that risk and uncertainty are inherited qualities of a new system. To manage them, classical engineering has always exercised care, incremental innovation and a reasonable conservatism (cf. [11] ). However, the latter seems to be a difficult option at the time of autonomous driving, smart homes, the Internet of things and similar initiatives; we need a new approach reconciling conservatism and novelty.
B. Main assumptions.
Our approach to assurance can be seen as an integration of process-and product-oriented approaches. To make it doable and conservative, we rely on process-oriented foundations, but our notion of process includes important aspects of product assurance by including relevant checks on product items using predefined acceptance criteria [13] .
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Figure 1. Conformance chain
Definition 1 (Main): System X is considered to be acceptably safe 2 (for a given application A in a given environment E) if the manufacturer's safety engineering process, SEP, satisfies the following two conditions: a) SEP is acceptably-well defined for a class of systems similar to X; b) SEP's definition is acceptably-well executed for X. In other words, according to empirical evidence and expert opinion encoded in condition a), if condition b) is satisfied for a system X, then X is safe for application A in environment E.
To make these general conditions technical and verifiable, we build three WF + -models: Wf SEP that models the SEP, Wf exe SEP (X) that specifies SEP's execution for system X, and Wf Norm that models a body of normative documents (standards, regulations, on-site manuals, expert opinion and all relevant domain knowledge), which regulate and prescribe how SEP is to be defined (but should give the manufacturer enough freedom to adapt to the norm). We specify these models as specially profiled class diagrams (we say metamodels) so that condition a) of Def. 1 amounts to checking if metamodel Wf SEP is a correct refinement of another (normative) metamodel Wf Norm , and condition b) amounts to checking conformance of an object model (instance) Wf exe SEP (X) to the metamodel Wf SEP .
Definition 2 (Main, more formal): System X is considered to be acceptably safe if the following two conformance conditions are satisfied:
where inst denotes instanceOf-relation and ref is a suitably defined refinement relation between workflows modelled as class diagrams. The index V&V refers to the necessity to check both Validity of the data and Verification of the formal relation ; later we will explain how validity checks can be reduced to another layer of syntactic verification. Figure 1 provides some details. Workflow metamodels Wf SEP and Wf Norm are class diagrams consisting of process classes (i.e., classes modelling processes), data classes, and dataflow associations, and constraints (basic and derived) that force the required semantics of the class diagram. Refinement amounts to having a syntactically correct mapping of the graph of process and data classes and associations in Wf SEP to a similar graph of Wf Norm , moreover, we require the mapping to be compatible with the constraints. For making the definition more precise and formal, finding an appropriate notion of workflow refinement and its formalization are crucial; we leave this for future work. As a possible starting point, we are investigating the notion of model transformation refinement proposed in [14] ; a formal definition of mapping's compatibility with constraints can be found in [15] . Conformance (b) is a well-known instanceOf relationship between an object (instance) diagram and a class diagram (the metamodel) established over a typing mapping between the graphs such that the constraints are satisfied. We will discuss it in more detail in Sect. IV-B Remark 1) Workflow conformance includes not only controlflow conformance (the primary approach in standard processbased approaches to certification) but also data conformance, which makes it product-based as well. Remark 2) In principle, the refinement chain can be extended with a deeper normative workflow Wf Metanorm regulating the definition of normative documents.
Thus, we reformulate assurance as a combination of (semi-)formalizable tasks, which are non-trivial, but known, partially well-studied and amenable to (semi-)automation. Using decomposition techniques described in [14] , the conformance checks can be done in a hierarchical way, which would make them manageable even for very complex workflows.
III. FROM GSN TO WF + , 1: PROCESS & DATA FLOW Figure 2 shows a GSN goal structure taken from the GSN Community Standard [9, p.14] ; we will refer to it as the (GSN) Example. We will interpret the Example as a sketch of a simple safety case, extract its semantic meaning and present it in WF + terms, and then compare the two cases, as schematically shown in Fig. 3 . In more detail, we will extract from the data in the Example a SEP definition workflow Wf SEP and show that the argument flow of the Example can be interpreted as checking conformance Wf exe SEP (X) V&V inst Wf SEP where X denotes the Control System considered in the Example. We then somewhat artificially create a normative workflow to simulate the second conformance check. Thus, all workflows occurring in formula 1 are extracted from the data provided by the Example.
A. Recover Semantics: GSN through workflow glasses
Even a superficial inspection of the Example's elements shows that they (directly or indirectly) refer to entities of several basic types. We will consecutively introduce them below.
1) Processes and data.: Several elements of the GSN diagram explicitly refer to processes. For example, context C4 mentions Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA), justification J1 mentions SIL Apportionment (SAppt), solution node Sn2 mentions FTA (Fault Tree Analysis), and goals G7, G8 talk about Protection Systems Development (PSDev). There are also explicit references to data, e.g., context C4 says that FHA produces a set of hazards, and strategy S1 together with goals G4-6 say that this set consists of three hazards, H={H1, H2, H3}, while goals G5-6 refer to probabilities of hazards H2-H3 occurrences. The results of such an inspection are shown in Fig. 4 , where references to processes and data are labelled by green and orange block resp., and special data residing in normative documents, Tolerability Targets in C3 and SIL Guidelines in C5, are shown in grey. (In addition, the input data for the entire SEP, i.e., the system data are shown with a darker orange shade.) A majority of data type names (such as Tolerability targets) are omitted and replaced by one generic name D to keep data blocks compact. Moreover, logical data, i.e., truth values, are special and shown by red round blocks T, which should actually read T:Bool -we again omitted the type to make blocks compact.
Colons in block labels show that we talk about instances of processes and data, i.e., individual executions of processes and individual data objects consumed and produced by processes. For example, PSDev refers to a definition of some process of Protection System Development, which was executed twice (see goals G7, G8) for two hazard groups: one has SIL=4 and presumably consists of very bad hazards H1 (of SIL=4) and H2 (of high SIL 4 or 3), the other group consists of hazard H3 with SIL=2 (and hence the group SIL=2). Executing process PSDev for group 1 has resulted in a primary Protection System, pr:PS, and executing PSDev for group 2 produced a secondary Protection System, sc:PS; the systems are specified by different data of the same type PS. Similarly, we have two executions of the FTA process, which provide probabilities of hazards H2 and H3 resp., i.e., data p2 and p3 of the same type P(robability), i.e., reals in the segment [0,1].
Note a logical error in the Example: assumption A1 is not needed for strategy S1, but is necessary for deriving G1 from G2 and G3 , i.e., it is a fundamental assumption of strategy S0 justifying this derivation. To fix this error, we added a strategy S0 and reassigned assumption A1 to S0 rather than to S1 (these corrections are shown by red). Another way to fix the error could be to reformulate goal G2 by erasing the adjective "identified" from its formulation.
2) Dataflow.: The diagram in Fig. 4 presents a very poor view of the story with all dataflow implicit. This is fixed in Fig. 5 , where process input and output flow is shown by, resp., orange/grey and green arrows. The resulting diagram is selfexplainable except, perhaps, the three processes below goals G4-G6 and their dataflow-we will explain them now.
Let's begin with execution 2:FTA. This process inputs data of the primary PS and performs FTA for hazard H2 providing its probability p2. Then this probability is compared with a certain normative value 10 −6 (see goal G5 and the grey arrow showing the dataflow from the Tolerability Target document, TTD) and if p2 < 10 −6 , we conclude that hazard H2 is sufficiently mitigated (formally, Mit(H2)=True). Note that while the comparison as such is a simple algebraic operation, the conclusion about the mitigation of hazard H2 is a much more complex process based on a nontrivial domain knowledge encoded in the TTD. To model such type of argument flow, we introduce a special type of processes (D|= ? C) ⇒? that evaluates whether some data D satisfy some constraints C and what is a Boolean-valued consequence of such an evaluation. We thus assume that these processes consist of two parts: formal syntactical checking D |= C, and its safetyrelated semantic consequence. Goals G5 and G6 encode two executions of such processes resulting in truth values True for hazards H2 and H3 (note important dataflow links to these processes from hazards, which are assumed coupled with their SILs provided by FHA). We have a similar workflow for elimination of hazard H1: the formal verification procedure as such only provides data d1, while whether these data really show that hazard H1 has been eliminated is another issue addressed by the respective process Elim(H1) as shown in the diagram. For uniformity, we added some normative data (note the grey block ?:D) intended to model the knowledge of how verification data to be interpreted to conclude that hazard H1 is eliminated indeed.
So far, we have shown the workflow producing the truth values in goals G4-G6, but other truth values are still isolated and their production is not explained.
3) Reviewing.: The truth values in goals G7-8, and also in assumption A1 and justification J1 are produced by processes of a special type called Review. Reviewing is shown in Fig. 6 by purple round blocks labelled R. For example, to assure the statement required by justification J1, the process SAppt is to be reviewed, and similarly achieving goals G7 and G8 needs reviewing the corresponding executions of PSDev. A review R of process P (we omit colons) takes P's execution data as its input and outputs a Boolean value for the corresponding proposition about P (typically, correctness and/or completeness phrased in context dependent terms, e.g., completeness of FHA as phrased in assumption A1). 3 We have thus explained all truth values besides the upper three assigned to the top goals G1-3.
4) Logical inference.: The last part of the story is logical inference: in Fig. 7 , note three light-blue blocks ix:I (x=1,2,0) residing in strategy nodes and light-blue arrows connecting them to propositions. The inference i0 (in strategy S0) can be specified by logical formula A1 ⇒ (G2 & G3 ⇒ G1), and similarly for the two other inferential blocks: inference i1 is unconditional while i2 requires a side condition J1. Although inference goes bottom-up, we show it with top-bottom arrows following the GSN notation to reduce clutter. We also show the truth-values produced by the inference flow rather than by the process-dataflow in blue.
Note also that we changed the visualization of the dataflow from process :SAppt to proceses 1:PSDev and 2:PSDev to make it visually similar to the logical flow. We will discuss this later.
In the next subsection, we will convert our process-data annotations into an accurate workflow model.
B. Instance Conformance: Syntax
Process and data blocks in Fig. 7 sketch some workflow, which in this section we treat as an instance of some workflow definition/metamodel (Wf SEP in term of Sect. II). Making the latter syntactically accurate and semantically reasonable needs some domain knowledge beyond the workflow sketch in Fig. 7 , but we tried to minimize the extension beyond the Example.
We build the metamodel as a class diagram with a special type of class stereotyped Process (green in Fig. 8 ), whose instances are process executions. Dataflow to and from processes is shown with directed associations, while ordinary (static) associations between data classes (yellow and orange) are all undirected and oriented vertically. Orange data are input to the entire SEP process, consisting of three components, HARA, Design, Verification (note three green rectangles in Fig. 8 ), which are further decomposed as shown. The order of processes is shown with numbers prefixing process names (and can be inferred from the dataflow). We use rectangle frames to show decomposition, e.g., process HARA consists of three subprocesses. Boundary objects (circle with a vertical line attached) are used as aliases for data to reduce the number of crossing lines in the model, and purple elements will be discussed later (ignore them for a while). Red notes are used to denote constraints on data. For example, the attribute valid? of SIL must be True. SysML-like ports are used on the sides of classes to indicate that an attribute is produced by a process.
Attribute indentation denotes nesting (attributes of attributes)
The diagram is mainly a self-explainable completion of the annotated Example ( Fig. 7 ). Black-box labels loosely show the backward mapping to the GSN diagram to illustrate how our metamodel was derived from it. We only mention several points. Note attribute mitORelim of class Hazard and its multiplicity [1] , which says that each hazard is to be eliminated or mitigated but not both. If a hazard is to eliminated, then by composing associations occursIn and protectedBy, we obtain a derived association Elimination of multiplicity 0..1 as not each hazard is to be eliminated; similarly for hazards to be mitigated we obtain a derived association Mitigation. Now multiplicity [1] implied multiplicity [1] spanning the two association ends (shown blue as it is derived) says that each hazard is to eliminated or mitigated by exactly one PS. protecs and consistsOf and demands a protection system to protect against at least one hazard(this kind of association is not essential for safety, but is useful for ensuring there are no idle systems not protecting hazards, for example, after a design iteration) Also, process FV in Fig. 7 is specialized as a state space exploration, which assures hazard elimination iff the hazardous state is not reachable. The comparisons residing in goals G5, G6 are specified as executions of the query specified in box 3b.2, which is defined to assure hazard mitigation.
Note a special feature of the workflow: data produced by a process are connected to its input data, e.g.,Process 3b.1 takes a pair (H,PS) consisting of a hazard H and a PS intended to mitigate H, uses this data to conduct a fault tree analysis, and outputs the Real Probability of H occuring with PS in place as an attribute of H.
The metamodel in Fig. 8 defines a workflow, which can be executed for any data correctly instantiating the orange part of the diagram, and thus instantiate the yellow part of the class diagram (commonly referred to as WorkProducts). The GSN Example actually tells us a story about such an instance Wf exe SEP (X) as shown in Fig. 9 , where the dataflow from (green) processes to (yellow) are omitted to avoid clutter (ignore purple underlined circles with arrows for a while) . It is easy to see that the instance workflow Wf exe SEP (X) satisfies all constraints declared in the metamodel workflow Wf SEP .
C. Instance conformance: Semantic validity
In assurance, there are two main questions about instances. The first is its syntactic correctness: whether all constraints declared in the metamodel such as Wf SEP in Fig. 8 are satisfied. This task can be done automatically with modern MDE tools. The second question is more challenging: syntactically correct data can be semantically invalid e.g., for instance Wf exe SEP (X), a hazard can be missing from set Hazard.allInstances={H1, H2, H3}, or the SIL of hazard H3 is to be 4 rather than 2 so that hazard grouping must be changed, or if even all SILs are valid, grouping was done incorrectly and hazard H2 is to be grouped with H3 rather than H1, etc. In fact, a majority of the instance elements are to be checked for semantic validity (we will say validated), including the results of verification. Validation of an element x in instance Wf exe SEP (X) is done by reviewing the process that produced x, e.g., FHA for the hazard set completeness, SIL Determination for SILs validity etc.. Review processes (we say reviews) are denoted by purple underlined circles in the metamodel Fig. 8 ; we only show three of the total six (not seven as Query is computed automatically and does not need reviewing). Review executions in Fig. 9 are also purple. To simplify notation, we show the dataflow from a process to its review by an arrow and omit the intermediate data: this is just a syntactic sugar for a detailed specification considered in the next subsection.
D. Reviewing as an aspect
The pattern in Fig. 9 of a process producing data followed by a review checking the validity of that data is shown only once but in reality is repeated in many different places in a typical SC. Thus, reviewing appears as a typical crosscutting concern and should be appropriately managed along the lines developed by the aspect-oriented programming community (AOSD), [16] . In our context, we need a mechanism of enriching a core metamodel with an aspect metamodel (advice, in AOSD terms) developed separately and weaved into the core metamodel at specified points (pointcuts). We are not aware of any AO-frameworks for metamodeling presented in the literature, and leave development of such for future work. Below we will use the main idea of aspect weaving [17] for metamodel weaving in the following sense.
. Aspect weaving A crosscutting concern is specified by an advice metamodel M adv , whose part M entry ⊂ M adv specifies an entry, to which the advice is to be applied. Formally, we model this as an embedding mapping e : M entry → M adv . Now, having a main metamodel M main with a set of entry points in it, for each such point ep we specify a mapping w ep : M main ← M entry (see Fig. 11 , in which given metamodels are framed and given mappings are solid, while computed mappings are dashed) and apply the pushout operation (PO) to the pair (e, w ep ), which will result in the merge M main + M adv modulo the common (shared) part M entry : thus, we have weaved M adv into M main (details of how operation PO works can be found, e.g., in [18] ).
In Fig. 8 , three (from total six) entry points are shown with underlined purple circles, and the advice metamodel to be weaved with them is described in Fig. 10 . It shows a very simple example of an actual review process around the key idea: the review observes performance data of a process, say P , including when and how it was executed and who the executor(s) were, alongside with the inputs and outputs of P . The review then outputs a Boolean value that (dis)approves the semantic validity of the critical data produced by P . What data are to be validated, and how reviewing is to be organized, is to be determined in the normative documents and be accordingly implemented in SEP.
IV. FROM GSN TO WF + , 2: ARGUMENT FLOW In Sect. IV-A, we show how the data-driven inference mechanism of WF + works We will try to follow the argument flow of the Example as much as possible, but be forced to deviate from it: the argument flow in the Example does not match its data flow, whereas our formal data-driven inference procedure forces the former flow to follow the latter. We discuss the discrepancy in Sect. V after we show how inference on the level of metamodel interacts with their instances in Sect. IV-B.
A. Data-driven logical inference
The WF + -based inference is described by Fig. 12 . It shows the metamodel Wf SEP , in which green process blocks are omitted to save space (but implicitly are there) but aliases (in Figure 9 . An WF + -instance further referred as Wf exe SEP fact, entry points) of all six review processes are shown (in purple). There are several changes in the representation of the data part. We introduce an abstract reified association hzProtection (generalizing associations Elimination and Mitigation (whose lines are omitted to avoid clutter), and derive from multiplicities for attribute mitORelim and associations Containment and grProtection (see Fig. 8 ) that association hzProtection is composed
with multiplicities as shown (circled blue as they are derived).
To shorten formulas, we will abbreviate the names above by hPr, Cnt, and gPr resp. The fact that association hPr is composed from Cnt and gPr, is shown in the diagram by two orange arrows from the component associations to the composed one-this is a simple case of data derivation (or querying). Important new elements in Fig. 7 are claims, i.e., natural-language formulations (in the assurance parlance) of data constraints, which are shown as notes attached to constraints. E.g., claims A11, A21 (pink notes on the left) are attached to encircled data constraints as shown, and claims A12, A22 (bold red and white font) are attached to validity constraints.
Note an important difference between pink and red claims. Claim A11 is a simple syntactic constraint: it is violated if a hazard H does not have a SIL (all attributes have multiplicity 1 by default) or its SIL is an integer greater than 4. Claim A12 is a semantic requirement of the validity of SIL assignment, e.g., if a hazard H is assigned SIL=2 whereas it is so dangerous that its SIL should be 4, then constraint A11 holds while claim A12 is violated. To formalize the latter as a constraint, we introduce SIL's attribute valid? of type Boolean, produced by the corresponding review process, and require the value of this attribute to be T(rue). In GSN, conjunction of (syntactic) A11 and (semantic) A12 would typically be formulated in semantic terms as phrased in the claim note A1.
In a similar way, we can treat claim A2 (below A1) as conjunction of a syntactic part A21 (the pink note) phrasing multiplicity 1 (note the dashed line), and a semantic part A22 validating whether the hazard grouping is done right w.r.t. safety engineering guidelines. Conjunction of A1 and A2 can be formulated as in the claim note A so that we have the inference tree from A11, A12, A22, A21 to A as shown in the diagram We can identify claim A with context J1 of the Example, more accurately, constraint A can be seen as a formal model of (somewhat fuzzy) claim J1 (note the black box labelled J1 attached to note A). Based on this assumption, we somewhat arbitrarily distribute the meaning of J1 between its subclaims (note labels 1/4 of J1).
Our seemingly pure logical work above was actually guided by data and dataflow in the metamodel. Two orange (the data colour) dashed lines from note A to class SIL (data element D1(A)) and association Containment (element D2(A)) which point to data defining the validity of claim A. The meaning of A then guides us in finding the relevant data constraints A11 and A21, while processes that produce data D1(A), D2(A) point to reviews needed for validation-the decomposition of A into conjunction i≤2,j≤2 A ij is data driven! We can proceed in exactly the same way with decomposition of claim GP (below claim A that refers to the Apportionment part of the story while GP stands for the GroupProtection part). We will mention briefly several points. The semantic claim GP2 is formulated in parallel to goal G2 in the example, and the name of the semantic validity attribute is changed from the common valid? to a special name following the Example's context C5. Then we infer GP⇐GP1 & GP2 and HC⇐A & GP, where HC (HazardCoverage) is a claim about the com- posed association hPr (note the orange link). We also know that the SEP requires to verify all hazard coverage links (which instantiate association hPr). Verification processes evaluate attributes ver? (whose Truth is required by corresponding pink constraints), which are then validated by reviews evaluating attributes valid? (with red Truth constraints). We thus have an inference tree for claim CV as shown in the diagram. Next we assume that having a coverage link H-PS between hazard H and system PS (an instance of hPr) verified and validated means that system PS does protect against H. We then derive claim HP. Finally, assuming hazard analysis completeness HI, we derive the top safety claim SS as shown.
B. Constraint derivation: From metamodels to instances
Constraints are elements of metamodels, and their derivation lives on the metamodel level while a typical GSN case builds an argument flow for a concrete system, i.e., an instance. The gap is bridged by the soundness of our derivation steps: we derive semantically rather than by syntactic rules. In more detail, suppose we have a metamodel M = (G M , C M given ) with G being its graph of classes and associations, and C M given a set of constraints defined over G. An inference tree can be schematically presented by a sequence of inference steps C M given = C 0 der |= 1 C 1 der |= 2 . . . |= n C n der = C M der C! where |= i is an inference step extending a set of derived constraints C i der with a new constraint C i so that C i+1 der = C i der ∪ {C i }; the initial set consists of all constraints initially given in the metamodel; and C M der is the final set containing the top claim C!. Soundness of a step i means that for any instance I properly typed over G M , if I |= C i der then I |= C i+1 der . By transitivity, if I |= C M given and all steps are sound, then I |= C!. Soundness of some of our derivation steps is based on simple logic, e.g., the inference CV⇐EV & MV is sound because of the data condition hzProtection = Elimination∪Mitigation, which is in turn implied by multiplicity 1 of Hazard's attribute elimORmit (see Fig. 8 ). Some inference steps can be seen as merely definitions, e.g., A1⇐A11 & A12. And some derivations are semantically non-trivial, e.g., when we conclude that having a coverage link H-PS both verified and reviewed implies that PS really protects against H. A common approach to such derivations is to require strong validation criteria so that getting equality valid?=T for an instance I is not easy but being achieved would indeed mean that the semantic condition in question is satisfied.
Thus, for a given system X, if Wf exe SEP (X) |= C Wf SEP given , then Wf exe SEP (X) |= C! so that the B) part of an WF + -based safety case (see Def. 1) consists of two major subparts:
(B1) Constraint derivation over the SEP metamodel, C Wf SEP given |= C!, and (B2) Checking instance conformance, Wf exe SEP (X) |= C Wf SEP given , for a given system X, whose most challenging part is checking T for validity constraints (shown in red in Fig. ??) .
V. WF + VS. GSN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
We will begin with a brief survey of how we processed the material described in the Example (further Ex.GSN) and come to its WF + -version (Ex.WF + ) to set a stage for the discussion, then present the results of comparing Ex.GSN and Ex.WF + , and conclude with some general observations about GSN.
A. From Ex.GSN to Ex.WF + : Defining the DCC
We recognize that the main goal of the Ex.GSN diagram was to demonstrate the vocabulary of GSN elements and to show how they can usefully be put together rather than write an SC per se. To do this, the authors of the document chose to specify in GSN terms an oversimplified SC, which is a justifiable and reasonable choice: GSN is widely used for building and documenting SCs in many domains. The Ex.GSN-authors skillfully managed to address both goals: they described the notation and presented an interesting and seemingly well-arranged SC within a small diagram. This conclusion is justified by the fact that Ex.GSN has resided in the Standard without changes for eight years now, and motivates our idea to use Ex.GSN as a sample SC to show how WF + works.
Our comparative analysis needs an accurate description of what our processing brought to Ex.GSN. As Fig. 7 shows, Ex.GSN provides a listing of processes and data involved, and Fig. 8 shows that we did not intoduce in Ex.WF + new processes nor data classes (they all are labelled by the respective elements of Ex.GSN). However, classes (green and yellow) only give us a discrete view of the story without the dataflow between processes and data (green-yellow links), and associations between classes (yellow-yellow); below we refer to both types of links as dataflow. We have restored the missing structural links based on our understanding of the domain knowledge (DK) and thus came to metamodel Wf SEP in Fig. 8 . As this DK is sufficiently common, it seems reasonable to assume that the authors of Ex.GSN based their SC on a similar dataflow picture but kept it implicit. In addition, our WF + -glasses revealed two more actors on the stage. The first is a set of constraints for the dataflow, and the second one is splitting the argument flow into two parts: (data-driven) constraint derivation over the metamodel, and checking the instance conformance Wf exe SEP (X) inst Wf SEP (while a typical GSN SC considers argument flow for a given system X without mentioning the two levels).
We will refer to the differences between the two frameworks, GSN and WF + , as to DCC (Dataflow, Constraints, Conformance). Again, it seems reasonable to assume that all three actors are implicitly (and perhaps inaccurately) present in the Ex.GSN so that the only real difference between the two frameworks is that WF + treats DCC as first-class citizens while GSN keeps them underground. We can schematically write something like an equation WF + = GSN + Explicit DCC (DCC) Our next goal is to compare the two cases, Ex.GSN and Ex.WF + , to see whether DCC-explication is practically important or is mainly a theoretical bonus.
B. Mapping between the two diagrams
We compare two argument flow diagrams: GSN-diagram in Fig. 2 (referred to as Ex.GSN or "theirs") and WF + -diagram in Fig. 12 (Ex.WF + or "ours"). In the latter diagram, note black labels that map elements of Ex.WF + to elements of Ex.GSN. Some elements are a perfect match, e.g., our claims A and HP are exactly their justification J1 and goal G2 resp.; the labels can be seen as links specifying a wf2gsn-relation between the two diagrams. With this discipline, some of our claims have two labels, e.g., A has J1 and 1/4ofG2, where the fraction label refers to the place of the claim in the inference tree (fraction labels have other colouring schema to ease visualization), which makes relation wf2gsn of one-to-many type.
Finally, several elements in the lower part of our diagram are labelled X# to be read "the type of X" where X is a GSN element: the latter may be an instance level datum, e.g., solutions Sn1 and Sn2 (as related to instance-level goals G4-G6) while our classes Elimination and Mitigation are metadata to be labelled as Sn1# and Sn2# resp. Now some of the claims in our diagram have several labels, e.g., GP2 has label 1/8ofG2 by its place in our inference tree, label G3 as it is almost exactly Ex.GSN's G3, labels G7#,G8# because conformance of an instance Wf exe SEP (X) to GP2 would correspond to Ex.GSN's goals G7, G8 and solutions Sn3, S4 resp. Having placed all labels and hence defined the relation wf2gsn, we can begin our comparative analysis.
Mapping wf2gsn maps claims (nodes) in the WF + -diagram to elements/nodes in the GSN-diagram. For an ideal match between two diagrams, we would like this mapping to be compatible with the inference structure: if two our claims C1, C2 are mapped to GSN-elements E1, E2, and C1 is a subclaim of C2, then E1 should be a subclaim of E2 if they are both claims (this is an ideal case), or at least E1 is a "subelement" of E2 in some suitable sense, e.g., an assumption attached to a strategy S below goal G can be seen as a subelement of G. If the subelement relation is preserved but its depth is not, e.g., C1 is an immediate subclaim of C2 while E1 is a grandchild subelement of E2 (or the other way round), it would mean that one of the diagrams have a more detailed inference path than the other, which would still be a good match between the two inference trees.
Surprisingly, the mapping wf2gsn between the diagrams is not compatible with the inference structure and actually significantly distorts it. The most visible, and dramatic, distortion is the clear parallel structure of the GSN-diagram which is not the case for the WF + -diagram. In the GSN-diagram, the flow below goal G1 splits into two parallel branches: below G2 and below G3, while in the WF + -diagram, the image of G3 is claim GP2 in the left lower part, and thus the G3-branch is embedded into the G2-branch. Figure 13 illustrates what happens: the dataflow specified by three bold elbow red arrows (at the bottom) actually map the right branch of the argument flow to the bottom of the left branch.
Another distortion is the placement of assumption A1 as a subelement of G2 while actually it must be a subelement of the top goal G1 in GSN-diagram: see Fig. 13 , in which we introduced a strategy S0 to which A1 actually belongs. This displacement of A1 is logically obvious; it is surprising that it is going unnoticed for eight years. (An alternative way to fix the logical error could be to remove the attribute "identified" from goal G2 formulation.) There are also smaller discrepancies such as having context C3 in the upper part of GSN-diagram, while its proper place is close to bottom as shown by WF + -diagram.
Another major issue is non-distinguishing of the instancemetamodel layers in GSN. E.g., in the GSN-diagram, having a common Sn2 for two goals G5, G6 is correct on the level of types (see WF + -diagram) but incorrect on the level of instances: it may happen that FTA was executed correctly for hazard H2 and incorrectly for H3, necessitating different reviews and thus two executions of Sn2 as shown in our instance diagram in Fig. 9 .
C. Comparison
We will look at the mapping GSN -WF + from the two opposite sides.
1) WF + in the GSN view.: The GSN literature identifies the two basic ingredients of safety assurance: deduction (the process of deriving new claims from the elementary claims until the top claim is reached) and evidence (that supports the elementary claims) [19] On the level of the WF + -assurance architecture, we can identify GSN's deduction with the WF +task (B1) of constraint derivation (see the end of Sect. IV-B), and GSN's evidence support with WF + -task (B2): indeed, checking an instance conformance for a typical Wf SEP basically amounts to checking non-empty instantiation of the type graph G Wf SEP that satisfies multiplicity constraints, and then checking that all validity attributes have value T, which is close to providing evidence in GSN. As for elementary GSN blocks from which GSN diagrams are built (such as Goals, Assumptions, etc.), Fig. 7 on p.9 shows that every element of the GSN vocabulary gets its representation in WF + . Thus, WF + is expressive enough to model GSN on both levels: the architecture and the atomic blocks.
2) GSN in the WF + view.: We will begin with several technical observations (items a), b) below), and then discuss their general consequences in items c-g). a) Although a GSN diagram can include processes and data (see Fig. 4 on p.5), it does not have primitives to model dataflow (Fig. 5) . The result is that dataflow is lost (eg, as shown by Fig. 13 on p.17) or is (mistakenly) modelled by the argument flow: note the parallel structure of the dataflow and logical flow over strategy S2 in Fig. 7 on p.9, which may provoke errors. b) GSN flattens the two-level structure of checking the SEP execution on the elementary level (ref to the FTA thing), and on the conceptual/architectural level of constraint derivation (B1) and instance conformance (B2). c) A serious consequence of the lost dataflow is the absence of explicit traceability mechanisms (cf. discussion in Sect. VIII). d) Flattening (item b) often hampers comprehensibility and may lead to errors, which appeared even in our simple case (the same solution for two hazards) and can dangerously accumulate in large industrial safety cases. e) The GSN approach to structuring seems ad hoc. In WF + , the inference tree is built from claims (constraints) while GSN's inference involves several types of elements (note that claims in Fig. 12 are labelled by G, A, J in a seemingly unordered way ). Labelling in Fig. 8 shows a close relationship between data and context, but other types also appear there. f) While in WF + , graph-based object-oriented data drive the inference and thus facilitate building the safety case, GSN leaves safety case builders on their own with the problems of proof and evidence design, which can lead to an ad hoc inference structure as we have seen above. g) Overall, having the DCC trio (Data-Constraints-Conformance) explicit and formalized is a way better for building and documenting safety cases (cf. discussion in Sect. VIII).
VI. ASSURANCE AS CONFORMANCE, REVISITED: PARTS AND COLOURS OF SAFETY ASSURANCE
We first argue that the CAE interpretation of the GSN diagrams can be very much misleading. Then we recall the results of the previous section to show how the major question of safety assurance is answered in the WF + -fwk, and why we need the second conformance check Wf SEP ref Wf Norm . The last section provides some details.
A. GSN vs. CAE GSN-inspired but WF + -realized safety case would consist of three conceptually different parts.
Part 1. The SEP definition workflow Wf SEP , is to be provided. It includes all process and dataflow (green and orange), including reviewing (violet) and, importantly, constraints (red) over data and dataflow.
Part 1*. From constraints given in Part 1, new constraints/claims are derived (blue), and the corresponding inference tree eventually results in the top safety claim.
Part 2. The SEP execution workflow for system X is to be provided, Wf exe SEP (X), and demonstrated that the execution conforms to the definition, Wf exe SEP (X) inst Wf SEP . Specifically, the execution instance has to satisfy all given (red) constraints (which GSN would call "the body of evidence"). Then, by the transitive soundness of inference (see Sect. IV-B), we conclude that the instance satisfies the top safety claim too.
Importantly, the blue inference can be seen as a "proof" of the safety claim if only each inference step is semantically sound (Sect. IV-B)-this fundamental aspect of the argument flow is often underestimated in the GSN literature and, we believe, in the practice of writing safety cases in the GSN notation. Indeed, assuring soundness requires a justified strategy assigned to each decomposition/inference step, i.e., a strategy and its justification at each decomposition step are to be mandatory elements of GSN-based safety cases. However, the GSN syntax does not make a justified strategy a mandatory element, and many safety cases appearing in practice do use this liberty, e.g., the GSN Community example we considered above.
Moreover, a majority of GSN decomposition steps are not of logical nature and show a process decomposition rather than logical inference. For example, suppose we want to provide a more detailed evidence for the claim HI: All hazards have been identified (see Fig. 12 on p.14) rather than just FHA reviewing. Then we need to decompose FHA into smaller subprocesses, then decompose the latter into smaller subroutines and so on, and correspondingly, FHA reviewing will be composed from more elementary reviewing acts. The result will be a refined SEP definition, over which we can build a refined inference tree, but the latter is actually not needed: as we have seen in Sect. IV-A, inference is a straightforward (and practically trivial) consequence of the process and data decomposition. The essence of deriving claim HI is in the FHA decomposition, and each step of such decomposition is to be justified and assured to be semantically sound in the following sense: if all subprocesses P i of a process P are well done, then the process P is well done.
The decomposition we are discussing can well be phrased in terms of goal decomposition: To assure that the system is safe (SS or G1, see Fig. 12 ), identify all hazards (HI or A1) and protect the system against each hazard (HP or G2). To identify all hazards (HI), do the FHA in the following way .... (see the above). To protect the system against each hazard (HP), make sure that all identified hazards are covered (HC), and each beingCovered relationship is verified and validated (CV). To ensure each hazard has been covered, make sure that apportionment is done well (A) and all hazard groups are covered (GP), and so on. Thus, what is shown in Fig. 12 as inference, is actually nothing but goal decomposition or, technically, a SEP decomposition into FHA and HP (hazard protection subbranch), followed by HP's further decomposition into HC and CV, and so on as shown in Fig. 12 or in more detail in Fig. 8 (p.10 ). Phrasing this decomposition in logical terms (CAE) can be misleading as it creates an impression of a "proof" that decomposition is done right (Fig. 12) , while actually such a "proof" is missing from Fig. 12 .
Indeed, how do we know that if i) all hazards are identified and ii) the system is protected against each identified hazard, then the system is safe? In the logical sense, this is just a tautology: if a hazard is something that can make a system unsafe, then the system is, by definition, safe iff it is protected against all hazards. Other inference steps in Fig. 12 are also mainly tautological if considered in a purely logical way because they contain not only syntactic verification (which is formal and thus indeed logically inferential), but also semantic validation part. For example, the syntactic part of claim HC (i.e., the multiplicity 1 of association 'protectedBy') can be formally derived from the syntactic parts of claims A and GP (which are multiplicites 1 of their corresponding associations traced by dashed ornage lines) based on the equality (2) on p.12-this is a logical inference step, but it is very simple. As for the semantic part, we need either to postulate a definition that HC is A & GP (which makes the inference HC ⇐ A & GP trivial), or to consider HC as being semantically different from A & GP and thus making the inference step HC ⇐ A & GP semantically non-trivial and hence requiring a justification. The latter would refer to previous experience and expert opinion that the process of covering hazards by doing, first, their apportionment/grouping, which is then followed by designing protection system for each group, is a reliable pattern that ensures hazard coverage (claim HC) if the two subprocesses are properly executed. Similarly, if we do not want to consider the final inference SS⇐HI & HP as being merely a definition of hazards, we need to reformulate it as a claim about SEP decomposition: if the processes FHA and HP (system protection against all identified hazards) were properly done, then the system is safe. Clearly, semantic validity of such a claim needs a special justification, which is typically missing from safety cases employing this pattern.
We do not think that the goal of a GSN inference tree is to demonstrate trivial tautologies, and there should be a real content behind the inference steps. As our discussion above shows, this real content consists of claims about process decomposition -each inference step is a decomposition step, so that the entire inference tree amounts to justifying the SEP definition. In other words, the actual goal of the blue part of Fig. 12 is to ensure the SEP definition given by Fig. 8 . To achieve this goal, each decomposition/inference step should be provided by a justification assuring the semantic validity of the step, and we come to item a) in our general definition of safety Def. 1, which so far was largely ignored in our discussion. Importantly, the WF + formalism per se, including its formal constraint derivation, does not address the issue we are discussing, and the term WF + in the title of this subsection refers to the entire approach to assurance we describe in this report rather than to a special type of workflow modelling.
A major question we are discussing is this: Why Wf SEP , if properly executed for a system X, results in a system X with required critical properties, and the WF + -approach offers the following generic answer. A proper execution of Wf exe SEP (X) results in a system X with the required critical properties because: a) the SEP definition is based on a collective experience in dealing with systems similar to X; b) all novelties brought by X were analyzed by experts and addressed according to general patterns of addressing such novelties, and the SEP definition was appropriately amended; c) other arguments justifying that the SEP satisfies its required critical properties. Our formulations have a large room for improvement and accuracy, we give them just to show the nature of the required arguments.
In the WF + , assurance conditions such as a,b,c above, are subsumed by an appropriately defined notion of conformance of the SEP definition workflow Wf SEP to some virtual workflow Wf Norm , which models and integrates the set of all relevant normative and guiding (formal and informal) documents into a workflow Wf Norm (the next section provides some detail). Thus, Parts 1 and 1* of a generic safety case can be combined into Part 1 + : Assuring that the SEP is properly defined by showing its conformance (as a workflow Wf SEP ) to some normative workflow Wf Norm (both are actually WF + -objects).
In general, this conformance can be managed similarly to the instance conformance we considered in this report (Sect. [3] [4] . The next section provides some details.
C. Conformance to Normative doc 1) The Normative Document: The main question above is also discussed in paper [11] , which outlines how the issue is addressed in the classical engineering domains. Similar to our requirement R6, one of their main points is that sufficiently prescriptive guidelines based on established foundations (we say 'normative documents') for the devlopment of safetycritical systems must be provided to ensure their safety. However, the question of whether the SEP definition conforms to the corresponding established foundations/normative docs is far non-trivial. Traditionally, the latter are written in natural languages, contain many cross referenced sections, subsections, tables, etc., and their full understanding can require a huge amount of time and efforts. Moreover, even full understanding of a standard (such as ISO 26262) does not guarantee its uniqueness because of ambiguities inherent in natural language formulations and possibly different backgrounds of the standard writers and the standard readers.
In WF + , we propose to model the integrity of normative documents (domain-specific standards, internal company procedures, legal requirements) as a metamodel Wf Norm to guide the development of a Wf SEP and, moreover, to provide a definitive second layer of assurance by checking conformance Wf SEP ref Wf Norm (see item a) in Def. 2). A manufacturer would develop their Wf SEP by refining a very abstract Wf Norm to the point that it can be executed. Through conformance to Wf Norm , a manufacturer can be sure that they satisfy all prescriptive guidelines and thus gain confidence in the safety of their system (as long as Wf Norm is reliable indeed).
Similarly to the instance-metamodel conformance, the refinement conformance also has two components: syntactic and semantic. Syntactic conformance is shown by demonstrating that a SEP metamodel is indeed a refinement of the normative metamodel in some formal sense. Semantic conformance should validate that the SEP satisfies the intent of the normative metamodel, and is much more challenging. We propose to address it similarly to the issue of SEP execution validity, i.e., by reviewing: each piece of the SEP definition should be checked for conformance to the normative docs and then reviewed.
From an MDE perspective, replacing the traditional approach with a model-based WF + could provide the following benefits: a) it avoids the ambiguity of natural language; b) it improves understandability by providing explicit process flow, dataflow, and constraints; c) it presents information more intuitively by utilizing the workflow notations.
Remark 1 (Multiple Normative Documents): Manufacturers normally must conform to many domain-specific standards, internal company procedures, legal requirements, and other normative documents. These standards are often interrelated, overlap and can even be contradictory. The WF + -approach models this as a single virtual workflow Wf Norm defined as an imaginary merge of the components, in which discrepancies are reconciled. Implementation of such a merge requires an accurate specification of all complex relationships between normative documents, and the corresponding tool support for model matching and merging.
Remark 2 (Deeper justification): As explained in Sect. IV, establishing the soundness of an argument may be difficult. While an instance must only demonstrate conformance to its SEP, and an SEP must only demonstrate conformance to its normative documents/workflow, the latter must also be justified somehow. This justification can be interpreted as yet another one conformance mapping to a system of informal elements based on experience, empirical evidence, best practices, and patterns.
VII. TOWARDS A UML PROFILE FOR WF + MODELLING
1) The meta-metamodel.: The WF + -models we used in the paper are encoded as UML class diagrams of a special type. Special features of this type are 1) Two types of classes: process classes and data classes 2) Two types of associations: a) dataflow associations from data to process classes and back b) static data associations from data to data classes.
Specifically, there are associations from the output data of a process to its input data -this is the essence of WF + . 3) Special process class: Reviewing. Each data elements is supplied with mandatory validity checking. The latter is realized as a cross-cutting concern (a.k.a as an aspect), i.e., a metamodel fragment attached to the main metamodel at a specified point as explain in Sect.3.4 4) Several constraints regulating the interaction above. The most important one is that the process classes and their dataflow form an hierarchy (a directed acyclic graph without looping, DAG); note that looping mentioned in 1b is purely static! Technically, the requirements above can be implemented as a UML profile, or a domain specific language. A high-level meta-metamodel for this profile is shown in Fig. 15 .
2) WF + Design.: WF + -design methodology,as any design methodology, is difficult to formalize, but we have found several patterns demonstrated in Sect.3. We start with a GSN case and convert it into a WF + by following the following steps.
1) Label the GSN diagram with processes involved (green labels in Fig.4 ) The SEP-logic may require adding new (sub)processes. 2) Discover the dataflow of the processes identified in 1 (the yellow and grey labels in Fig.4 ).
3) Identify claims and model them as constraints with
Boolean truth-values (red labels). 4) Supply each data associations with a reviewing block (violet circles in Fig.6 ) thus converting fundamental validity requirements of a principally semantic nature into syntactical constraints. 5) Add logical claim inference -blue blocks and blue arrows in Fig.7 . 3) Model management.: There are two special requirements to a model management engine to handle WF + -models. 1) To execute aspect weaving, i.e., be able to add the reviewing metamodel to the main metamodel at any specified point. 2) To have a special query interface for the special structure of the metamodel, e.g., build the control flow view of a WF + -model (by transitive closure of the In-Out relationships), or build a data dependency graph w.r.t. the dataflow embodied into the WF + -model.
VIII. APPLICABILITY AND POSSIBLE IMPACT OF WF +
We have analyzed seven major issues with SCs identified in a survey on SCs used in practice [12] . These issues correspond well with our own experience of SCs in industryand overlap with our requirements described on p.1. Below, for each issue we provide its italicized summary(and refer to our similar requirements), followed by the applicability of WF + in corroborating and/or addressing the issue, followed by GSN's inability to manage (or, worse, its ability to create) the issue.
1) Scalability Navigation and comprehension of the SC is difficult.
Current tools either fail to deliver features to handle scalability, or are domain-specific and not generalizable. (Plus R4, R5) WF + + + : a) All traceability is explicit and extends into the development process, the product artifacts and even the environment, thereby improving detailed understandability, b) The framework is model-based and allows for compositionality and hence decomposition and modularization and so, in spite of the complexity of the system and its trace-links, there are built in constructs for managing this. GSN: SCs are difficult to comprehend due to the amount of implicit information and their ad hoc structure that is evident even in simple SCs (see Fig. 7 ); for large industrial SCs, these deficiencies can accumulate enormously and really prevent understanding. WF + + + : The SEP and SC meta-models are integrated. We thus have complete traceability between model elements, explicit dataflow and explicit process flow, all of which are crucial for impact analysis and change management. A strict separation of instance and meta-levels of modelling provides a convenient reusability mechanism. GSN: Traceability is almost entirely omitted, making change management a very difficult task. The GSN SC appears as entity separate from the SEP and other product artifacts.
2) Managing Change
3) Requiring special skills to create Graphic notations of SCs are intuitive to understand, but creating a well-structured, convincing SC requires special skills/experience. The privacy of information in SCs prevents the sharing of knowledge on effective patterns and strategies. (R3: a unified approach reduces the need for special skills.) WF + + + : a) Workflows are a natural way for engineers to understand their work. As a result, WF + provides an intuitive and easily understandable framework for building SCs. b) A strict separation of instance and meta-(and metameta-) levels of modelling allows experts to create templates and share effective patterns and strategies (with a reduced fear of revealing sensitive information about products). GSN: For engineers, it is difficult to convert their intuitive understanding of the story of a system's safety into the onedimensional structure of GSN-style safety cases. 4) Complexity of the system Identifying safety concerns is extremely difficult in complex systems due to the difficulty of managing and identifying interactions between different subsystems. Multidisciplinary collaboration is also challenging. (R2, R4, R5)
Complexity. WF + + + : a) Traceability does help to identify interactions. b) Compositionality of WF + allows for decomposition a classical engineering approach to manage complexity. GSN:The absence of traceability links makes interaction anal-ysis very difficult unless the SC assessor has been deeply involved in the creation of this system. But then the assessment can suffer from confirmation bias. Collaboration. WF + + + : An intuitive common language allows experts to share different perspectives and facilitate discussions GSN: Ad-hoc structure and implicit information leaves room for ambiguity, potentially impeding communication between teams. 5) Uncertainty, trust, confidence Issues of confidence and trust are seen as intangible. This leaves room for doubt about the efficacy of SCs and makes it difficult to establish trust. (R3, R4, R6)
Confidence and trust are notoriously difficult to quantify in the context of assurance, and have long been a topic of debate [20] . WF + + + : a) Conformance of the SEP-definition to normative documents makes a "half" of the framework and thus directly addresses the issues above. b) Creating data-driven argument flow in WF + is difficult, but if managed, it provides a high level of confidence as it is explicit and formalized. GSN: The ability of manufacturers to generate trust in their safety cases is dependent upon their ability to express what has been done to reviewers. GSN-style SCs provide little support for this as they leave massive arrays of data, process and dataflow details implicit. 6) Too flexible Flexibility can be dangerous because manufacturers can overlook aspects of safety. Conflicts of interest and confirmation bias contribute to this danger. This is closely related to establishing trust and confidence. (R6) Independent assessment has been shown to be effective in reducing confirmation bias [21] . WF + + + : A well-defined structure for SCs and the ability to offer templates to guide their development, allowing assessors to gain expertise in evaluating SCs. GSN: The ad-hoc structure of GSN-style safety cases makes it very difficult to develop expertise in analyzing these safety cases, making it far too likely that holes in arguments will go unnoticed. 7) Incomplete information Survey: Limited integration of SC management into the software development process causes challenges in collecting sufficient and accurate information for safety arguments. Incomplete traceability, insufficiencies in testing and flawed safety requirements are all issues that arise as a result of this. (R3, R4, R5) WF + + + : Processes and complete traceability between data are incorporated. This enables integration of the Design and SEP and SC development, allowing for systematic change impact analysis and, with proper tooling, automated updating of SCs in response to changes in data and gathering of data, ensuring information is properly managed. GSN: a) GSN-style safety cases argue over instance-level data. The notion of processes flow and dataflow are omitted almost entirely. b) Implicit traceability leaves room for data to be left behind or forgotten.
IX. RELATED WORK
A series of seminal papers [22] - [24] introduced the ideas of metamodeling and model management into assurance, but their main focus was on data conformance rather than dataflow. Dataflow was the focus in [14] but they do not consider the argument flow, and focus on process decomposition rather than on SCs. Analysis of GSN-based SCs has an extensive literature, but it is mainly focused on the logic than the dataflow (see a survey in [19] ). Several ways of formalizing SCs were suggested by Rushby in [25] , but his focus is more on the argument structure. Tooling for GSN-based SCs is discussed in [3] intraprocess structure WF + has its origin in block diagrams (as a networking mechanism) and model transformations as processes over GBOO data, but differs from both of them as illustrated by the schema in Fig. 16 . Model refinement [26] and process refinement [?] have extensive literature, but we have not found yet the notion most suitable for our needs to model conformance to the normative documents.
Inter
X. CONCLUSION
We have shown that GSN-style safety cases suffer from two inherent drawbacks. The first, technical, is implicitness and incompleteness of the dataflow and traceability in the GSNstructured safety cases (see Sect. 5). The second, conceptual, is the absence of assuring the SEP definition, which is an important constituent of safety assurance (Sect. 6). The worst feature of GSN safety cases is that they fake logical inference and thus create a false sense of confidence that safety had been demonstrated acceptably well.
We have presented WF + as a modelling framework which meets the core needs of creating, documenting and managing safety cases. Precise dataflow modelling, the benefits of the traceability inherent in the UML class modelling, the intuitive understandability of workflows, and a well-founded approach to developing assurance claims modelled by OCL constraints over a SEP metamodel, result in an approach that integrates processes, product and safety cases. This integration is both conceptual and technical-the latter is based on explicit traceability links relating all constituents that matter in the SEP. This comprehensive traceability is crucial in consistency management, in which we strive to maintain consistency between the various artifacts within all the associated models.
